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TRENDS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF A STATE COURT JUDGE
SANDRA D. O'CONNOR*
We live in an imperfect world. Most people would agree our
court system suffers from some of that imperfection. We appear to
be the only major country with two parallel court systems. Among
other things, such an arrangement affords most convicted criminal
defendants opportunities for multiple post-conviction appellate
court reviews. The labyrinth of judicial reviews of the various
stages of a state criminal felony case would appear strange, indeed,
to a rational person charged with devising an ideal criminal justice
system. Changes and improvements come very slowly, if at all, and,
more often than not, incrementally, in small case by case
adjustments.
State courts, which annually process the great majority of all
civil and criminal cases filed in this country, handle their workload
for the most part without a great deal of concern about the federal
court system which exists alongside them. Trial judges in both sys-
tems are busy hearing cases. Most state court trial judges do not
have time to think about what jurisdiction the federal courts
should have; they simply take each case assigned and do the best
they can with it, whether or not it involves a federal legal question.
On the other hand, state appellate court judges occasionally be-
come so frustrated with the extent of federal court intervention
that they simply abdicate in favor of the federal jurisdiction. For
example, concern in the Supreme Court of Arizona with the extent
of the exercise of federal jurisdiction of prisoner complaints led it
to refuse to hear any prisoner complaints because of "preemption
of the field" by the federal courts.1
It is my purpose to comment on some of the trends in the rela-
tionship between the state and federal courts as viewed from the
* Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals. A.B., LL.B., Stanford University.
1. Patricella v. Arizona, No. H 650 (Ariz. April 24, 1973).
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practical perspective of a state court judge.
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Application of federal constitutional law by state courts is made
most often in state criminal prosecutions. A state criminal defen-
dant gains access to the federal courts by alleging that a violation
of the Federal Constitution occurred during the state proceedings.
There is seldom a state criminal felony trial in which the defen-
dant is convicted that does not result in an appeal at the state
level alleging some federal constitutional error in order to exhaust
the state remedies before seeking federal review. As noted by Jus-
tice Powell in his concurring opinion in Rose v. Mitchell: "Federal
constitutional challenges are raised in almost every state criminal
case, in part because every lawyer knows that such claims will pro-
vide nearly automatic federal habeas corpus review." 2
Every state court trial judge realizes, of course, that federal con-
stitutional challenges will be raised in almost every state criminal
case and that, after the state appellate review is exhausted, further
review will be attempted in the federal courts. As a result, state
courts in urban areas have tended to assign certain judges to hear
only crimial cases in order that they may become more familiar
with applicable state and federal, substantive and procedural,
criminal and constitutional law. In addition, the National Center
for State Courts, the Institute of Judicial Administration, and the
National Judicial College continually offer assistance to courts and
to state judges on various aspects of how they can appropriately
function within the state and federal constitutional parameters.
There is a keen awareness among state court judges in state crimi-
nal cases of the federal constitutional protections of the defendant.
With the election of President Reagan, there is no reason to
think the recent trend in the United States Supreme Court shift-
ing to the state courts some additional responsibility for determi-
nation of federal constitutional questions in state criminal cases
will not continue. As stated by Charles Whitebread:
[T]he Warren Court, which was extremely energetic in ex-
panding the scope of federal constitutional claims open to state
2. 443 U.S. 545, 581 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
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prisoners, seemed to act on the premise that the state courts
could not be depended upon to vindicate these newly created
rights. Thus, it forged new law on the procedural as well as sub-
stantive front by providing greater access to federal court for
state defendants. Federal habeas corpus became the principal
remedy through which the newly created rights could be as-
serted and protected. By contrast, as the Burger Court has lim-
ited the substantive federal constitutional rights of the state
criminal defendant, it has simultaneously reduced dramatically
the avenues available for state prisoner access to the lower fed-
eral courts.3
A recent example of the increased reluctance of the United
States Supreme Court to overturn by federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings state court determinations in criminal cases is found in
Sumner v. Mata.4 The Court in Sumner held that a federal court
that grants federal habeas corpus relief to a state criminal defen-
dant is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to presume the state appel-
late or trial court's factual findings are correct and to explain the
reasons for determining that the state court's findings were not
fairly supported by the record. The majority opinion states: "Fed-
eral habeas has been a source of friction between state and federal
courts and Congress obviously meant to alleviate some of that fric-
tion when it enacted subsection (d) in 1966 as an amendment to
the original Federal Habeas Act of 1867. ''1
The response of state courts to the trend toward some restriction
of review of state criminal cases by federal habeas corpus is ex-
plored in an article by A.E. Dick Howard.' Professor Howard con-
cludes that in the area of criminal procedure, most state courts
show "an inertial tendency simply to follow the.., federal deci-
.sions" because of the deference owed to the. United States Su-
preme Court or the desirability of uniformity of state and federal
law.7 However, he details examples of a number of state courts
3. C. WHrrBAD, CRmmAL PRocmUR § 28.01, at 574 (1980).
4. 101 S. Ct. 764 (1981).
5. Id. at 770.
6. Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62
VA. L. Rsv. 873 (1976).
7. Id. at 905. See also Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HRv. L. REv. 489 (1977).
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which have relied upon their own state constitutions as a means of
defining rights of criminal defendants more broadly than do the
federal courts.8
In the next decade, there will probably be significant additional
state court variations in cases involving the issue of illegal search
and seizure under the fourth amendment. Since Stone v. Powell,9
state criminal defendants who -have had a "full and fair opportu-
nity" to raise their claims of illegal search and seizure in the state
courts may not, thereafter, obtain federal habeas corpus relief. We
do not yet know the tests to be employed in determining what is a
"full and fair opportunity." However, assuming the state courts are
providing a full and fair opportunity for the claims to be raised,
and that federal habeas corpus review is unavailable, the state
courts are more likely than their federal counterparts to reach
widely varying results on search and seizure issues. Even the fed-
eral cases on search and seizure are not models of clarity and sim-
plicity. The standards tend to be confusing and obtuse in some
instances.10
One area where federal court review of state courts' determina-
tions of federal constitutional questions may be expected to in-
crease, however, is the area of state criminal defendants' waiver of
their constitutional objections. State criminal defendants seeking
habeas corpus relief in the federal court must raise their constitu-
tional objections in a timely fashion in the state proceedings, or
they will be held to have waived their claim for relief, absent a
showing of cause why the objection was not raised and also a show-
ing of actual prejudice.1" We can expect a number of petitions to
be filed for habeas corpus relief to test the extent to which failure
8. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975);
State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66
(1975) (Eagen, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351
(1974); Advisory Opinion to the Senate, 108 R.I. 628, 278 A.2d 852 (1971). See generally
Howard, supra note 6, at 891-905.
9. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
10. For some articles addressing the confusion in the case law in the fourth amendment
area, see Burkoff, The Court that Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an
Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. Rv. 151 (1979), and Countryman, Search
and Seizure in a Shambles? Recasting Fourth Amendment Law in the Mold of Justice
Douglas, 64 IowA L. REv. 435 (1979).
11. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976).
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of defense counsel to raise the issue in the state proceedings will
establish good cause for avoiding the waiver. Competence of coun-
sel may be relevant to the determination of good cause and of
prejudice.12
Closely related to the question of waiver of the constitutional
issue at the state level is the question of competence of counsel as
a ground for collateral attack on state convictions on the basis of
the sixth amendment. This issue is one which will undoubtedly be
raised very frequently during the next few years. At present, it is
the single issue raised most frequently in Arizona appellate courts
in petitions for post-conviction relief in criminal cases.' s
The United States Supreme Court has held that counsel must
render legal services "within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys m criminal cases." 4 This standard is far from definitive.
No doubt the range of competence varies somewhat from commu-
nity to community and from state to state. The older test of
whether the proceedings were a "farce and mockery of justice" has
been rejected m all but three of the federal circuits.' 5 The other
circuits have developed differing standards for determining the
competence of counsel.'" The majority follow a "reasonable compe-
12. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 94-96 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
13. Seventy-five petitions for appellate post-conviction relief m criminal cases were filed
m Arizona in 1980. Of these, twenty-seven, or 36%, raised the issue of competence of coun-
sel. Letter from John Sticht, Staff Attorney, Arizona Court of Appeals to Judge Sandra D.
O'Connor, Arizona Court of Appeals (Feb. 25, 1981).
Direct appeals from state criminal convictions frequently involve an allegation that there
was a failure at trial to raise a defense, to make an evidentiary objection, or to request a jury
instruction. Unless the failure resulted in "fundamental error," the state appellate court will
ordinarily affirm the conviction. See, e.g., State v. Workman, 123 Ariz. 501, 600 P.2d 1133
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Bell v. State, 598 S.W.2d 738 (Ark. 1980); People v. Means, 97 Mich.
App. 641, 296 N.W.2d 14 (1980); State v. Moon, 602 S.W.2d 828 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); People
v. Vasquez, 430 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1980); State v. Foddrell, 269 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va.
1980). The same is true m appeals to federal appellate courts from convictions m federal
criminal cases. FED. R. CRim. P 52; see, e.g., McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754 (5th
Cir. 1967).
14. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
15. Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel - The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARv.
L. RE V. 633, 641 n.40 (1980); Fifth Annual Ninth Circuit Survey-Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure-New Effective Assistance of Counsel Standard-Prejudice Required, 10 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REv. 75, 79 n.29 (1980). See generally Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Coun-
sel Claims: New Uses, New Problems, 19 ARiz. L. REv. 443 (1977).
16. See authorities cited note 15 supra.
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tency" or analogous standard. 17 The District of Columbia Circuit
has adopted a standard which requires the defendant to show that
his counsel performed measurably below accepted standards and
that the inadequacy of counsel had a "likely" effect on the out-
come of the trial.18 State standards for determining competency
likewise vary.19
It is reasonable to expect that we will continue to see many state
and federal cases dealing with the appropriate standard for effec-
tive assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment. In view of
the conflicting holdings in the federal appellate courts, the Su-
preme Court may accept jurisdiction and attempt to establish a
more definite standard. It is also likely that some strain may be
felt by some state courts as their determinations of attorney com-
petence are reviewed in the federal courts.
CIVIL CASES
Although the present trend in federal review of state criminal
matters appears to be to restrict some of the federal jurisdiction,
quite the reverse trend seems to be occurring in civil cases, both by
federal judicial decisions and by congressional action. Although not
arising as frequently as in the criminal area, federal constitutional
law, as it applies to state legislative and executive action, is per-
haps of more concern to state courts in terms of forcing significant
decisions to be made in cases of great public interest. We have
seen recently examples of acute confrontations between federal
district courts and state courts in school busing and school deseg-
regation cases. Application of the federal guaranty of equal protec-
tion of the laws has resulted in court review of state voting require-
ments,20 state durational residence requirements for welfare
17. See Cooper v. Fitzharns, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 974 (1979).
18. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Sateran, 366 Mass. 89, 96, 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (1974)).
19. See, e.g., Bays v. State, 240 Ind. 37, 159 N.E.2d 393 (1959) (requiring reasonable skill
and diligence), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 972 (1960); State v. Osgood, 266 Minn. 315, 123
N.W.2d 593 (1963) (requiring consultations that adequately inform the accused of all his
legal rights).
20. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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benefits,21 and other state welfare eligibility requirements,22 in ad-
dition to public educational opportunities.2 s Application of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment has resulted in court
review of state prison regulations,24 state procedures for garnish-
ment,25 and prejudgment attachment of property by creditors.2 6
The Snadach,27 Fuentes,2  and Mitchell" decisions of the
United States Supreme Court have resulted in a great many state
court cases which have focused on interpretations of those cases,
and m various state legislative amendments to prior state laws on
prejudgment garnishments and attachments. Confusion exists
among students of the subject concerning the meaning and import
of the Supreme Court decisions on prejudgment creditors' rights
and remedies.30 The subject of creditors' rights is surely one of the
subjects most often addressed in state courts on a continuing basis.
It is apparent that we have not heard the end of the matter from a
federal constitutional perspective, and that the federal courts will
continue to issue additional opinions defining the validity of vari-
ous state laws on the subject.
Another area of recent contact and some confusion between the
state and federal courts is in medical malpractice cases in some
states. With the rapid escalation of malpractice insurance premi-
ums, many states have adopted legislation requiring administrative
21. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
22. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
23. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
24. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
25. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
26. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
27. Snmadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
28. Fuentes v. Shevm, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
29. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
30. See, e.g., Kheel, New York's Amended Attachment Statute: A Prejudgment Remedy
in Need of Further Revision, 44 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 199 (1978); Levine, Due Process of Law
in Pre-Judgment Attachment and the Filing of Mechanics' Liens, 50 CoNN. B.J. 335 (1976);
Nickles, Creditors' Provisional Remedies and Debtors' Due Process Rights: Attachment
and Garnishment in Arkansas, 31 ARK. L. REv. 607 (1978); TeSelle & Love, Attachment,
Garnishment, Replevin, and Self-Help Repossession in Oklahoma, 30 OLA. L. REV. 253
(1977); Comment, Can Georgia Bank on Its Garnishment Laws?, 28 MERCER L. REv. 341
(1976); Comment, Attachment in California: Another Round of Creditors' Rights and
Debtor Protection, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1015 (1979).
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review, quasi-judicial review, or mediation prior to trial. 1 The pro-
cedures are generally not binding on the parties and are designed
to screen out frivolous claims.
When the malpractice suit is filed in a federal court under its
diversity jurisdiction, the federal courts are divided on whether
they must follow the state's review procedure when that procedure
is to be implemented after the lawsuit is filed.3 2 The issue focuses
on whether the federal court in a diversity suit must apply the sub-
stantive law of the forum state as required by Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,"5 and thereby discourage forum shopping,"4 or whether
the federal court should refuse to apply the state law because it
would violate an important federal policy or would "alter the es-
sential character or function of [the] federal court. '3 5 Where the
state law requires submission to a state review or mediation panel
before the lawsuit is filed, the federal cases uniformly appear to
dismiss the federal action if the state prefiling procedure is not fol-
lowed. As states attempt to control more of the tort litigation by
arbitration and other devices, we can anticipate more confusion
and confrontation with federal courts on whether the state proce-
dures must be followed in the diversity cases.
The next decade is also likely to see continued expansion of liti-
gation in the federal courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,11 the civil
rights statute, unless Congress decides to limit the availability of
relief under that statute. Many, if not most, of the cases alleging
31. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (West Supp. 1980); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-
581.1 to .20 (1977 & Supp. 1980). See generally Alexander, State Medical Malpractice
Screening Panels in Federal Diversity Actions, 21 Aiz. L. REv. 959 (1979).
32. Compare Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978) (refusing to refer a di-
versity malpractice action to a Rhode Island mediation panel), with Byrnes v. Kirby, 453 F
Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1978) (following the Massachusetts system of presenting offer of proof
to a state panel), and Von Mosher v. Tan, No. Civ. 77-3 (D. Ariz. March 27, 1979) (referring
the matter to state medical review panel).
33. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
34. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-69 (1965).
35. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1958) (quoting Her-
ron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931)).
36. See Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979); Davidson v. Sinai Hosp. Inc., 462
F Supp. 778 (D. Md. 1978), afl'd, 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980); Marquez v. Hahnemann
Medical College & Hosp., 435 F Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Flotemersch v. Bedford County
Gen. Hosp., 69 F.R.D. 556 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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due process or equal protection violations by the states, their of-
ficers, and employees are filed under section 1983. Allegations that
the plaintiff has been deprived of either personal liberty or prop-
erty of any amount m violation of his civil rights will give the fed-
eral court jurisdiction to hear the claim. Even state court judges
are not immune from a section 1983 suit if the allegation is that
the judge acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction in the matter.38
Judge Aldisert has observed that each expansion of the use of sec-
tion 1983 to challenge state action has been prompted by a distrust
of the state courts as proper forums to consider the issues raised.39
In the past, the United States Supreme Court has held that
plaintiffs alleging state civil rights violations need not exhaust
state remedies before filing suit in the federal court under section
1983.40 More recently, however, the Court has stated, "whether this
is invariably the case . . is a question we need not now decide."'41
In Barry v. Barch, 4'2 the Court reaffirmed the Gibson v. Berryhil14'
holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required
when the question of the adequacy of the administrative remedies
is for all practical purposes identical with the merits of the section
1983 action. The United States courts of appeals are divided on
the issue of whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is
a necessary prerequisite to the federal suit.
44
38. Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1980).
39. Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on
Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 L. & Soc. ORDER 557, 572.
40. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (per curiam); Damico v. California, 389
U.S. 416 (1967) (per curam); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
41. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1973).
42. 443 U.S. 55, 63 n.10 (1979).
43. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
44. For cases holding exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required, see Patsy v.
Florida Int'l. Univ., 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981); Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823 (7th Cir.
1978); Gonzales v. Shanker, 533 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1976); Wishart v. McDonald, 367 F Supp.
530 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1974).
For a case holding exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required only when pro-
spective relief is sought, see Canton v. Spokane School Dist. No. 81, 498 F.2d 840 (9th Cir.
1974).
For cases holding exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required, see Simp-
son v. Weeks, 570 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Ricketts v. Lightcap, 567
F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1977); Gillette v. McNichols, 517 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1975); Hardwick v.
Ault, 517 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1975); McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
dismissed, 426 U.S. 471 (1976); Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
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In view of the great caseload increase in the federal courts and
the expressed desire of the Reagan administration to hold down
the federal budget, one would think that congressional action
might be taken to limit the use of section 1983. It could be accom-
plished either directly, or indirectly by limiting or disallowing re-
covery of attorneys' fees. Such a move would be welcomed by state
courts, as well as state legislatures and executive officers. In fact,
however, Congress appears to have moved recently to open further
the federal jurisdictional doors. In the closing days of the 96th
Congress, the $10,000.00 amount in controversy requirement was
totally eliminated for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331."5 The elimination of the amount in controversy require-
ment may have been prompted by the fact that there is no amount
in controversy requirement for section 1983 actions filed under the
jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3).48 For claims arising
under the Constitution or a federal statute securing equal rights,
plaintiffs wishmg to file in federal court were able to simply couch
their complaints in terms of section 1343(a)(3) rather than section
1331. Regardless of the reasons, Congress has expanded the juris-
diction of the federal courts by the amendment to section 1331.
Congress has also added to the scope of federal court jurisdiction
in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.' The Act gives the federal
district courts "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil
proceedings arising in or related to" the debtor in a Title 11
proceeding."8 Starting in 1984, that jurisdiction will be exercised by
the new bankruptcy courts.49 Effectively, then, this broad grant of
45. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2, 94
Stat. 2369. However, the Act retains the $10,000.00 amount in controversy requirement for
suits based on knowing violations of consumer product safety rules unless suit is brought
against the United States or an agency of the United States or an officer or agent of the
United States in his official capacity. Id. § 3.2.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (Supp. 1I 1979) grants district courts original jurisdiction to
hear claims alleging a "deprivation, under color of any State law, of any right, privilege
or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens "Id. (emphasis added). Because a § 1983 clain
may be based upon the deprivation of any statutory right provided by Congress, Maine v.
Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980), § 1983 and § 1343(a)(3) are not coextensive.
47. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 28
U.S.C.).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. II 1979).
49. Id. § 1471(c).
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jurisdiction will allow the bankruptcy courts to hear any proceed-
ing related to the debtor.50 Actions which formerly had to be tried
in state court, or in a federal district court, such as a tort or con-
tract action involving the debtor, or perhaps even a divorce, may,
as of 1984, be tried in the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court
may abstain from exercising its jurisdiction, but the decision to ac-
cept jurisdiction or to abstain is not reviewable by appeal or other-
wise.51 The expanded jurisdiction repesents "an assertion of the
bankruptcy power over State governments under the supremacy
clause, notwithstanding a state's sovereign immunity. '52 Under the
new code, all pending civil proceedings in any forum, with only a
few listed exceptions, are stayed by the debtor's filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition.51
The potential effect on state courts of the exercise of jurisdiction
by the federal bankruptcy court over proceedings in state courts in
which the debtor is a party is great. For example, in Maricopa
County, Arizona, there were 4,462 petitions in bankruptcy filed in
1980." It is estimated that in the Maricopa County Superior Court
of Arizona alone there are already 186 pending cases which have
been stayed because one of the parties is involved in a federal
bankruptcy proceeding. 55
Another area of federal civil case jurisdiction which Congress
may exammine in the next few years is the diversity jurisdiction.
The debate over whether Congress should eliminate diversity juris-
diction from the federal courts has continued for some years.5 I
Any discussion of whether diversity jurisdiction should be elimi-
50. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1977), reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6010.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d) (Supp. HI 1979).
52. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1978), reprinted in [1979] U.S. Con CONG.
& AD. NEws 5787, 5837.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. H 1979).
54. Unpublished figures compiled by Virgina Fritz, Clerk, United States Bankruptcy
Court, District of Arizona.
55. Unpublished figures compiled by Gordon Allison, Mancopa County Superior Court
Administrator.
56. For an argument favoring abolition of federal diversity jurisdiction, see Kastenmeier
& Remington, Court Reform and Access to Justice: a Legislative Perspective, 16 HARv. J.
LEGIS. 301, 311-18 (1979), and authorities cited theretn. For an argument in support of
maintaining federal diversity jurisdiction, see Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, 16
HARv. J. LEGIS. 403 (1979).
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nated, and any discussion of where the line should be drawn for
the exercise of federal jurisdiction in state criminal and civil cases
generally, requires examination of the assertion often heard that
the federal courts are the preferred forum. Let us examine the ar-
guments made to justify the conclusion that federal judges are pre-
ferred. First, it is argued that federal judges are better paid and
have more prestige.57 It is certainly true that most federal judges
are better paid.58 However, the higher pay does not necessarily at-
tract only the most competent lawyers to the federal bench. Often
political considerations are more important than pure competence
in the appointing process. In addition, many appointments to the
federal bench are made from state court benches. 59 When the state
court judge puts on his or her new federal court robe he or she
does not become immediately better equipped intellectually to do
the job.
Second, it is said that life tenure insulates the judge from
majoritarian pressure, and, therefore, the federal judges are more
receptive to controversial principles.60 In twenty states, however,
57. See, e.g., Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HA v. L. REv. 1105, 1121, 1124-27 (1977).
58. From March 1977 to December 31, 1980, yearly salaries for federal district judges
were $54,500 and for federal circuit judges, $57,500. United States v. Will, 101 S. Ct. 471,
476 (1980). Beginning January 1, 1981, yearly salaries for federal district judges are $67,100
and for circuit judges, $70,900. 67 A.B.A.J. 162, 165 (1981).
As of January 31, 1979, the national average salary for associate justices (excluding chief
justices) of the highest state courts was $45,248; for state intermediate appellate court
judges, $45,278; and for general trial court judges, $38,971. U.S. DEm'T OF JUSTICE, LAW EN-
FORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, AND NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AND
STATISTICS SERVICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1979 110, Table 1.57
(1980) [hereinafter cited as 1979 SouRcEooK].
However, the average salaries of state trial court judges increased by more than 90% be-
tween 1969 and 1980, while the salaries of federal courts of appeals and district court judges
increased by less than 40% during the same period. 67 A.B.A.J. 162, 164 (1981). And certain
state judges receive salaries far higher than the averages given above. For instance, the chief
justice of the state of California now receives $77,409 a year, and the chief judge of the
highest New York court, the court of appeals, receives $75,000 a year. Id.
59. A study of characteristics of presidential nominees and appointees to United States
court judgeships from 1963 to August 27, 1978, broken down by presidential administration,
reveals that percentages of nominees who at the time of their nomination or appointment
were employed by the judiciary ranged from 28.5% under President Nixon to 42.2% under
President Carter. In addition, percentages of nominees with prior judicial experience ranged
from 34.3% under President Johnson to 46.7% under President Carter. 1979 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 58, at 115, Table 1.60.
60. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 54, at 1105, 1127-28.
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we now have merit selection of state judges rather than popular
elections."1 These judges are relatively safe and secure in their po-
sitions. Even those state judges who are elected often have reason-
ably long terms of office.6 I have seen remarkable examples of the
exercise of courage and judicial independence by state court
judges.
Third, it is argued that federal judges will be more receptive to.
federal constitutional claims. Professor Bator has answered this ar-
gument quite well in his article published in this issue.63 What is
really being said is that federal judges are inclined to be more re-
ceptive to some federal constitutional claims. Professor Bator is
correct in stating what is required is a sensitivity and responsive-
ness to all the constitutional principles, not just some of them."
There is no reason to assume that state court judges cannot and
will not provide a "hospitable forum" in litigating federal constitu-
tional questions. As stated by Justice William H. Rehnquist in a
recent opinion:
State judges as well as federal judges swear allegiance to the
Constitution of the United States, and there is no reason to
think that because of their frequent differences of opinions as to
how that document should be interpreted that all are not doing
their mortal best to discharge their oath of office.65
The allegations concerning relative competency and judicial
mmdset are essentially subjective impressions not subject to con-
firmation in fact. Perhaps even the subjective impressions of law-
yers are changing. In a recent survey conducted by Justice James
Duke Cameron of the Arizona Supreme Court, attorneys in ten ju-
risdictions, at various locations throughout the United States, were
asked certain questions as they filed civil actions in the state
courts.66 The attorneys were asked to state the nature of the action
filed, their preference for the court, state or federal, for filing the
61. Carbon, Judicial Retention Elections: Are they serving their intended purpose?, 64
Jun. 210, 213-15 (1980).
62. Adamany & Dubom, Electing State Judges, 1976 Wisc. L. REv. 731, 769.
63. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, pp. 605-37 supra.
64. Id. at 631-32.
65. Sumner v. Mata, 101 S. Ct. 764, 770 (1981).
66. See Appendix A infra.
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action, assuming there were no jurisdictional barriers or time con-
straints, and the reasons for that preference. Two hundred and
fifty-two lawyers responded. One hundred and ninety-three law-
yers stated they preferred to file in the state court, and thirty-four
stated they preferred to file in a federal court. Of those preferring
the federal court, the reasons most often given were a superior pro-
cedure, better judges, and quicker disposition of cases. Of the ma-
jority preferring to fie in state courts, the reasons most often given
were a quicker disposition of cases, familiarity with the state court,
and convenience. In general, a majority of lawyers responding to
the questionnaire indicated they perceived no difference in the
quality of judges between the federal and state courts. The results
indicate that the lawyers who responded saw no great difference in
the quality of judges or justice between the state and federal
courts.
Another indication that attorneys do not perceive substantial
differences in the quality of judges in the state and federal courts
can be found in the bar association polls taken in jurisdictions hav-
ing a merit selection system for judges. For example, in Arizona's
most recent bar poll, both the state and federal judges were rated
on a variety of qualifications. The overall results varied in Mari-
copa County, Arizona, from a low rating of sixty-three percent for
the federal district court judges to a high rating of nmety-seven
percent and from a low rating of sixty percent for the state court
judges to a high rating of ninety-nine percent.6 7
CONCLUSION
If our nation's bifurcated judicial system is to be retained, as I
am sure it will be, it is clear that we should strive to make both the
federal and the state systems strong, independent, and viable.
State courts will undoubtedly continue in the future to litigate fed-
eral constitutional questions. State judges in assuming office take
an oath to support the federal as well as the state constitution.
State judges do in fact rise to the occasion when given the respon-
sibility and opportunity to do so. It is a step in the right direction
to defer to the state courts and give finality to their judgments on
67. 15 ARIZ. B.J. (August 1980) (Newsletter).
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federal constitutional questions where a full and fair adjudication
has been given in the state court.
The jurisdiction of state courts to decide federal constitutional
questions cannot be removed by congressional action, whereas the
federal court jurisdiction can be shaped or removed by Congress."6
Proposals are sometimes made to restrict federal court jurisdiction -
over certain types of cases or issues. Among the proposals which
have merit from the perspective of a state court judge are the elim-
ination or restriction of federal court diversity jurisdiction, and a
requirement of exhaustion of state remedies as a prerequisite to
bringing a federal action under section 1983. If we are serious
about strengthening our state courts and improving their capacity
to deal with federal constitutional issues, then we will not allow a
race to the courthouse to determine whether an action will be
heard first in the federal or state court. We should allow the state
courts to rule first on the constitutionality of state statutes.
At both the state and federal levels, efforts should continue to be
made to improve the judicial selection processes, and to provide
adequate and appropriate training for those selected. The states
should, in my view, adopt procedural rules which are generally pat-
terned after the federal rules of criminal and civil procedure, and
evidentiary rules which are the same or parallel to the federal rules
of evidence. In this way perhaps parity will become less a myth
and more a reality.
68. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2; Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Sheldon
v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440 (1850).
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APPENDIX A
Total Compilation of Questionnaire Results
Number of Questionnaires .............................. 500
Num ber of Replies .................................... 252
1. Nature of action (divorce, contract, tort, etc.)
D ivorce ..................................... 79
T ort ........................................ 71
Contract .................................... 74
O ther ....................................... 32
2. If there were no time or jurisdiction problems
and you had a choice, would you have preferred
to file this case in a federal court or in the state
court:
Federal court ................................ 34
State Court ................................. 193
N o Preference ............................... 18
3. Would you please list briefly your reasons. [Not
all responded; some gave more than one reason.]
a. Those who prefer to file in federal court(34):
1. Quicker disposition of cases ......... 11
2. Superior procedure ................. 8
3. Quality of judges ................... 8
4. Quality of federal court system ...... 5
5. Individual case assignment method 4
6. Larger damage awards .............. 2
7. Federal Rules of Evidence .......... 2
8. Shorter trials .... : ................. 2
9. -More apparent authority ............ 2
10. Less likelihood of political influence 2
b. Those who prefer to file in state court (193):
1. Quicker disposition of cases ......... 48
2. Fam iliarity ........................ 39
3. Convenience ....................... 38
4. Cooperation with attorneys and liti-
gants ............................. 12
5. Jurisdiction ........................ 11
6. Jury system (12 jurors and voir dire) 9
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7. Local issues best resolved by state
courts ............................. 8
8. Arrogance of federal courts ......... 7
9. Quality of judges ................... 4
10. Judges know state law .............. 4
11. More efficient system ............... 3
12. Less judicial interference ........... 3
13. Federal court preference for criminal
cases .............................. 3
14. Inflexible procedure of federal courts 3
15. Sm all case ......................... 2
16. Inexperience with federal courts ..... 2
Those who gave no preference (18):
1. Quality of judges equal ............. 3
2. Disposition of cases equally fast ..... 1
3. Procedural rules identical ........... 1
4. Simple action ...................... 1
5. Federal judges experienced in state
court system ....................... 1
4. In general, do you feel that the interest of your
client is better served in the federal court or the
state court?
Federal court 33 State Court 124 No difference
94
5. In general, do you believe that the quality of
judges is better in the federal court or the state
court?
Federal judges 95 State judges 30 No difference
125
6. Any comments you may wish to make. [Not all
responded with comments; some made more than
one comment.]
a. Those who thought the quality of the fed-
eral judges was better:
1. Merit selection system .............. 5
2. Preparation ........................ 3
3. Law clerks better .................. 2
4. Superior knowledge ................ 2
5. Fairer to out-of-state plaintiffs ...... 1
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6. Competence ....................... 1
7. State judge quality uneven .......... 1
8. Higher paid ....................... 1
9. Lower number of federal judges ..... 1
10. Pressure on state judges ............ 1
11. Dignified ........................ 1
12. More compassionate on social matters 1
b. Those who thought state judges were better:
1. Elected, so responsive to need of com-
munity and bar .................... 3
2. Federal judges arrogant because ap-
pointed for life .................... 3
3. More sympathetic to needs of attor-
n eys .............................. 2
4. Federal judges do not understand
state law .......................... 1
5. State judges diverse ................ 1
6. State judges allow litigants to litigate 1
7. State courts efficiently administered 1
8. State judges qualified ............... 1
Those who found no difference:
1. Quality of judges equal ............. 2
2. Federal judges not responsive to pub-
lic because not elected .............. 1
3. State judges have more consideration
for litigants and attorneys .......... 1
4. Federal judges not influenced by local
pressure ........................... 1
5. Federal judges not familiar with local
issues ............................. 1
6. Trial dates earlier in state system ... 1
7. Life appointments encourage omnipo-
tent behavior ...................... 1
8. Bar is negligent in evaluating judges 1
9. Availability of two court systems is
confusing .......................... 1
10. Illinois Rules of Evidence superior to
federal rules ....................... 1
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11. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
should be adopted in California ..... 1
12. Federal courts usurp state's control of
family matters ..................... 1
7. Those who thought federal judges were better,
but
a. preferred to file in state court ............ 58
b. felt the best interests of the clients were
better served by the state court .......... 28
